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THE Seventh Administrative Law Conference, sponsored by the
Administrative Law Section of The Florida Bar, was held on
March 16 and 17, 1990, in Tallahassee. The main focus of the Confer-
ence was on rulemaking procedures and whether Florida's rulemaking
procedures are more complex than necessary to protect the public
from arbitrary action by government agencies.
Participants met in plenary session to hear presentations from Pro-
fessors Arthur Bonfield, Johnny Burris, Harold Levinson and Ste-
phan Maher. Articles based on their remarks appear elsewhere in this
issue. Before the plenary session adjourned and participants reported
to their assigned small groups, I commented on the need to reform the
economic impact statement requirement and on two bills then pending
in the Legislature which were relevant to the topics under discussion. I
then provided an agenda to focus the small group discussions and to
organize the small group leaders' reports to the Conference.
This Article expands on my substantive remarks about economic
impact statements and on the legislation that was pending at the time
of the Conference. It concludes with a report on the small groups'
responses to the agenda presented to them.
II. ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENTS
As originally enacted in 1974, chapter 120 contained no mention of
economic impact. During the 1975 legislative session, however, section
120.54(1) was amended to require a summary of the economic impact
on all persons affected by any proposed rule as part of an agency's
notice of intent to adopt a rule. Agencies were permitted to determine
that a summary of economic impact was not possible, and, if that
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University. Carlow College, B.A., 1966; Du-
quesne University, J.D., 1969; Yale University, LL.M., 1970. An earlier version of portions of
this article was delivered at the Seventh Administrative Law Conference. I gratefully acknowl-
edge the research assistance of Thomas G. Thomas, a 1990 graduate of the College of Law.
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determination were made, a statement of the reasons for the determi-
nation was to be included in the notice.'
In 1976, the Legislature revisited the economic impact question.
Agency notices of intent to adopt a rule were still required to contain
a summary of the economic impact of the proposed rule on all per-
sons affected by it, but agencies were no longer able to determine that
estimating economic impact was not possible.2 In addition, the Legis-
lature required the preparation of an economic impact statement "us-
ing professionally accepted methodology, with quantification of data
to the extent practicable, giving effect to both short-term and long-
term consequences. ' ' 3 Economic impact statements were required to
contain specific information with respect to seven areas identified by
the Legislature. 4
Agency compliance with the economic impact statement require-
ment was doomed from the beginning. What started out as a laudable
attempt to make agencies articulate and thus think about the eco-
nomic consequences of regulatory choices, became instead an unat-
tainable mandate. In the first place, the requirement was vastly
overbroad. All agency proposed rules, both procedural and substan-
tive, were covered. Anything an agency chose to do by rulemaking-
adopt new policy by rule, amend existing rules, or repeal antiquated
rules-was subject to the economic impact statement requirement. But
perhaps the most demoralizing factor was that the Legislature made
no effort to fund the employment of people with the education and
experience to prepare professional economic impact statements. Faced
with this impossible situation, agencies did the best they could with
what they had knowing full well that neither was enough. After De-
1. Ch. 75-191, § 3, 1975 Fla. Laws 368, 370.
2. Ch. 76-276, § 1, 1976 Fla. Laws 750, 750.
3. Id. 1976 Fla. Laws at 751 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(a) (Supp. 1976)).
4. The following information was required:
I. A description of the action proposed, the purpose for taking the action, the legal
authority for the action and the plan for implementing such action.
2. A determination of the least-cost method for achieving the stated purpose.
3. A comparison of the cost-benefit relation of the action to nonaction.
4. A determination whether the action represents the most efficient allocation of pub-
lic and private resources.
5. A determination of the effect of the action on competition.
6. A conclusion as to the economic impact of the proposed agency action on preserv-
ing an open market for employment.
7. A conclusion as to the economic impact upon all persons directly affected by the
action, including an analysis containing a description as to which persons will bear the
costs of the action and which persons will benefit directly and indirectly from the
action.
Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(a)1-7 (Supp. 1976)).
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partment of Environmental Regulation v. Leon County,5 however,
even this approach became untenable. In that case the court ruled that
agency failure to provide an economic impact statement or to provide
a correct economic impact statement constituted an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority. The practical effect of this decision
was to make every rule proposed by every agency vulnerable to a suc-
cessful validity challenge under section 120.54(4). Attacking proposed
rules for inadequate economic impact statements quickly became an
unfair sport akin to shooting fish in a barrel.
Agencies sought relief from the Legislature during the 1978 session
and they were partially successful. The economic impact statement re-
quirement still applied to all agencies and to the adoption, amend-
ment, or repeal of all rules, but the "professionally accepted
methodology" language was repealed and the required information
was pared down from seven to four items. 6 In addition, adopted rules
were protected from challenge for inadequate economic impact state-
ments unless the challenge was brought within one year of the rule's
effective date. 7
Before the effectiveness of the legislative relief could be measured,
the courts relaxed the outcome determinative rule announced in Leon
County. In a series of cases decided in 1979, the courts characterized
the required preparation of an economic impact statement as a proce-
dural aspect of rulemaking.8 Judicial review of agency procedural er-
rors is governed by a harmless error standard.9 Thus, even when an
agency commits a procedural error, relief is unavailable unless the er-
5. 344 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
6. Ch. 78-425, § 2, 1978 Fla. Laws 1408, 1411 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(a)1-4
(Supp. 1978)). The information required in the economic impact statement was:
1. An estimate of the cost to the agency of the implementation of the proposed ac-
tion, including the estimated amount of paperwork;
2. An estimate of the cost or the economic benefit to all persons directly affected by
the proposed action;
3. An estimate of the impact of the proposed action on competition and the open
market for employment, if applicable, and
4. A detailed statement of the data and method used in making each of the above
estimates.
An estimate of the impact on small and minority businesses was added in 1985. Ch. 85-102, § 7,
1985 Fla. Laws 627, 634 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(b)1-5 (1985)).
7. Id. at 1411 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(c)).
8. Florida-Texas Freight, Inc. v. Hawkins, 379 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1979); Polk v. School Bd.
of Polk County, 373 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); School Bd. of Broward County v. Gram-
ith, 375 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
9. Section 120.68(8), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part that: "[tihe court shall
remand the case for further agency action if it finds that either the fairness of the proceedings or
the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a
failure to follow prescribed procedure."
19911
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ror causes an unfair or incorrect decision. The practical effect of these
decisions was to replace the old rule which heavily favored challengers
with a new one which heavily favored agencies. In fact, there have
been only fourteen reported judicial decisions since 1979 that have dis-
cussed the inadequacy of economic impact statements. Agencies have
prevailed in eleven cases;' 0 challengers have prevailed in three."
So at this point the statute demands the preparation of an economic
impact statement by every agency for every rule proposed. The courts,
however, excuse agency failure to comply with the statutory mandate
unless failure results in an unfair or incorrect decision. As a result,
agencies try only halfheartedly to comply with the statute and legiti-
mate legislative goals are frustrated. It seems to me the time has come
to introduce some measure of rationality into the economic impact
statement requirement. This means forcing the Legislature to face the
mess it has created. It never made any sense to require an economic
impact statement for all proposed rules. To continue that requirement
in the face of the judicial treatment of it compounds the problem.
I think it is time to consider a different approach to economic im-
pact statements borrowed from the 1981 Model State Administrative
Procedure Act. 2 That Act requires some level of concern about eco-
nomic impact to be expressed by a specified governmental entity or a
substantial number of people before preparation of a regulatory anal-
ysis is undertaken. 3 For discussion purposes, I proposed that the Con-
10. HUMHOSCO, Inc. v. Department of HRS, 476 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985);
Department of Nat. Resources v. Sailfish Club of Fla., Inc., 473 So. 2d 261, 265 (Fla. 1st DCA
1985), rev. denied, 484 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1986); Florida Waterworks Ass'n. v. Florida Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 473 So. 2d 237, 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. denied, 486 So. 2d 5% (Fla. 1986);
Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Florida Comm'n on Human Relations, 470 So. 2d 754, 757 (Fla.
1st DCA 1985); Humana, Inc. v. Department of HRS, 469 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985);
Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America v. Department of HRS, 463 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Fla.
1st DCA 1984); Department of Prof. Reg. v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984);
Brewster Phosphates v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 444 So. 2d 483, 487 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984),
rev. denied, 450 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1984); Department of Ins. v. Insurance Servs. Office, 434 So.
2d 908, 929-930 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), rev. denied, 444 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1984); Plantation Resi-
dents' Ass'n v. School Bd. of Broward County, 424 So. 2d 879, 881 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), rev.
denied, 436 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1983); Cortese v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 425 So. 2d
554, 558 n.12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 436 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1983).
11. Department of HRS v. Wright, 439 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Division of Work-
ers' Compensation v. McKee, 413 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Department of HRS v. Fra-
mat Realty, Inc., 407 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
12. MODEL STATE ADumIST. PROCEDUPE ACT of 1981, 15 U.L.A. 38 (1990) [hereinafter
1981 MODEL ACT].
13. The 1981 MODEL ACT states:
An agency shall issue a regulatory analysis of a proposed rule if, within [20] days after
the published notice of proposed rule adoption, a written request for the analysis is
filed in the office of the [secretary of state] by [the administrative rules review com-
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ference consider recommending a change to section 120.54 that would
require preparation of an economic impact statement only if the Joint
Administrative Procedures Committee' 4 or some significant number of
people-50, 100, 300-requested it. If the Legislature is serious about
requiring agencies to consider the "interplay between social and eco-
nomic factors,"" and if the Legislature wants "to ensure a compre-
hensive and accurate analysis of economic factors in this calculus" 16
then it seems to me those goals are better achieved by a statutory
scheme that requires the calculus to be done only when economic con-
siderations are indeed a legitimate concern. To require the exercise
routinely mocks both the importance of the undertaking and the seri-
ousness of the Legislature's purpose.
III. PENDING LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
There were two major bills pending in the Legislature at the time of
the Conference. Both bills were still in committee; it was appropriate
to focus attention on them so that participant reactions to their details
could be communicated to the legislative committees. One bill was
pending in the House Governmental Operations Committee,' 7 and the
other bill was pending in the Senate Governmental Operations Com-
mittee.'8 Neither bill had a companion in the other house. The House
bill addressed an area quite relevant to the rulemaking focus of the
Conference. It proposed imposing restrictions on the use of the adju-
dicatory process for the development of policy that should be adopted
as rules through the rulemaking process. The Senate bill tackled the
problems of subject matter indexing and availability of agency final
orders. While the Senate bill did not relate directly to agency rulemak-
ing, there was nevertheless an inevitable connection. If agencies can
develop policy through adjudication, it is essential that there be mean-
ingful access to those final orders so that the policy can be discovered
and known.
mittee, the governor, a political subdivision, an agency, or [300] persons signing the
request]. The [secretary of state] shall immediately forward to the agency a certified
copy of the filed request.
Id. at § 3-105(a).
14. Ch. 74-310, § 2, 1974 Fla. Laws 972 first enacted section 11.60, Florida Statutes, which
creates the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. The Committee is composed of six per-
sons-three members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House,
and three members of the Senate appointed by the President of the Senate.
15. Florida-Texas Freight Inc. v. Hawkins, 379 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1979).
16. Id.
17. Fla. HB 2539 (1990).
18. Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., PCB 90-6 (1990).
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A. Restricting Policy Development Through Adjudication
When chapter 120 was revised in 1974, a complex rulemaking proc-
ess was put in place. Notice of intent to adopt a proposed rule has to
be given wide circulation. 9 People who will be affected by a proposed
rule if it is adopted must be allowed an opportunity at a public hear-
ing to inform the agency about the effects of the rule and to argue for
changes they want.20 In some circumstances, the public hearing may
take on some or all of the procedures usually associated with adjudi-
catory proceedings. 2' In addition, a proposed rule's validity may be
challenged by any person who will be substantially affected if the pro-
posed rule is adopted. 22 An agency may not adopt a proposed rule
until the issues raised in the validity challenge proceeding have been
resolved in the agency's favor.23 Each proposed rule must be accompa-
nied by an economic impact statement. 2A An agency must also con-
sider a proposed rule's effect on small businesses, and make an effort
to reduce the proposed rule's impact on small businesses. 25 The Small
and Minority Business Advocate, Minority Business Enterprise Assis-
tance Office, and the Department of Commerce's Division of Eco-
nomic Development must be given an opportunity to urge the agency
to consider alternatives to reduce the impact of the proposed rule on
small businesses. 26 If the agency does not accept all the alternatives
proposed, the agency must submit a detailed written explanation to
the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) explaining
why the alternatives were not accepted. 27 The JAPC reviews almost all
proposed rules serving in its capacity "[a]s a legislative check on legis-
latively created authority. "2
When one considers all the attention the Legislature has given to the
rulemaking process and all the opportunities it has given to people
who will be affected by proposed rules, as well as those opportunities
it has given to small and minority business advocates and to itself act-
ing through the JAPC, to hold agencies accountable for the policy
contained in their proposed rules, it is simply not credible to believe
the Legislature did not intend agencies to avail themselves of this dif-
19. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1) (1989).
20. Id. § 120.54(3)(a).
21. Id. § 120.54(17). See also subsection C of section IV, infra.
22. Id. § 120.54(4).
23. Id. § 120.54(4)(c).
24. Id. § 120.54(2)(b).
25. Id. § 120.54(2)(a).
26. Id. § 120.54(3)(b)(1).
27. Id. § 120.54(3)(b)(3).
28. Id. § 120.545(1). See also subsection E of section IV, infra.
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ficult process when formulating policy. Nor is it credible that the Leg-
islature intended to leave to agency discretion the question whether
policy should be adopted as rules, especially considering how difficult
it is to run the gauntlet of section 120.54 rulemaking procedures. But
nowhere in chapter 120 did the Legislature require agencies to adopt
policy as rules after rulemaking accountability procedures were sur-
vived. 29 The Legislature's failure to write that simple command into
the statute left the door open for the courts to interpret the meaning
of this legislative silence.
Initially, the courts took the position that an agency policy state-
ment of general applicability that had not been adopted as a rule
through rulemaking procedures could be declared invalid in a section
120.56 rule validity challenge proceeding.30 Thus, any agency policy
statements which were intended by their own effect "to create certain
rights and adversely affect others"'" were vulnerable to attack if they
were not adopted following rulemaking procedures. The effect was an
unambiguous judicial message: make rules of policy statements or lose
the ability to use them.
Almost immediately, an exception was recognized. In McDonald v.
Department of Banking and Finance,3 2 the court said that only those
policy statements which were generally applicable had to be adopted
as rules in order to be used. Chapter 120, it was said, "recognizes the
inevitability and desirability of refining incipient agency policy
through adjudication of individual cases." 33 In the opinion, the court
referred to the policy that could be developed through adjudication as
incipient, emerging, or nonrule policy. Incipient, emerging, nonrule
policy had to be available for use or otherwise policy development
would be stifled. As the court explained:
The APA does not chill the open development of policy by
forbidding all utterance of it except within the strict rulemaking
process of Section 120.54. Agencies will hardly be encouraged to
structure their discretion progressively by vague standards, then
definite standards, then broad principles, then rules if they cannot
record and communicate emerging policy in those forms without
29. Before the 1974 revision, section 120.031(1), Florida Statutes, stated expressly that
"[o]nly rules adopted by an agency in the manner and form provided in part I shall be valid or
effective .. "
30. Department of Admin. v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
31. Id. at296.
32. 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
33. Id. at 581.
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offending Section 120.54. The folly of imposing rulemaking
procedures on all statements of incipient policy is evident. 34
Thus, McDonald granted agencies a limited dispensation from the
rigors of rulemaking to allow agency policy to mature. This matura-
tion was to occur over a period of time through case by case adjudica-
tion. Incipient, emerging, nonrule policy could be used by agencies to
support decisions in individual cases, but only at a cost. The policy
must be supported by evidence in the record and the policy is subject
to challenge by a party. The record evidence must be sufficient to con-
vince a hearing officer and ultimately a reviewing court that the policy
has merit. A final order which relies on incipient, emerging, nonrule
policy must fully explain that policy. "The final order must display
the agency's rationale. It must address countervailing arguments de-
veloped in the record and urged by a hearing officer's recommended
findings and conclusions . . . or by proposed findings submitted to
the agency by a party. ' 35 It was thought that this burden of exposition
would encourage rulemaking once the policy was known and settled
and the agency was prepared to apply the policy generally. Were it
otherwise, McDonald warned, "prescribed rulemaking procedures
... [would] be atrophied by nonuse." 3 6
Cases decided since McDonald, however, have broadened its limited
dispensation from rulemaking to include policy statements that are
not in fact incipient or emerging, but rather are generally applicable.
In Florida Cities Water Company v. Florida Public Service Commis-
sion 3 7 for example, the Florida Supreme Court characterized a newly
announced change of policy as "incipient" policy even though "[a]t
oral argument the Commission's counsel conceded that this new pol-
icy would be uniformly applied in all future cases. ... "38 And the
court went on to note that "[a]dministrative agencies are not required
to institute rulemaking procedures each time a new policy is devel-
oped, although that form of proceeding is preferable where estab-
lished industry-wide policy is being altered." ' 39 Florida Cities Water
has been read as meaning that agencies may choose whether to adopt
policy through rulemaking or proceed to develop policy-whether in-
34. Id. at 580.
35. Id. at 583.
36. Id. at 580.
37. 384 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1980).
38. Id. at 1282 (Boyd, J., concurring and dissenting).
39. Id. at 1281 (citations omitted).
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cipient or fully emerged-through adjudication without apparent
limit .40
Acting pursuant to the Speaker's request that chapter 120 be re-
viewed by the House Committee on Governmental Operations "to as-
sure that the public's interest in a system providing open and factually
based decisions, and fair and efficient dispute resolution, is ade-
quately protected," ' 41 the committee staff worked with an advisory
group of experts to undertake the review. 42 There was a general per-
ception among the staff and advisory group members that more and
more agencies were shunning the rulemaking process and were choos-
ing to rely on the adjudicatory process for the "development" of pol-
icy that was already fully developed. There was some suspicion that
rulemaking was being avoided by agencies that were pursuing espe-
cially controversial policies. And there was strong sentiment that
chapter 120 should be amended to limit the discretion the courts had
given agencies to decide whether and when they would rulemake.
Consequently, the committee staff and the advisory group focused
mainly on proposing measures to reform the perceived abuse of non-
rule policy making through adjudication. The result of those efforts
was House Bill 2539.
The bill proposed creating a new section in chapter 120 immediately
following the definition section in the current law. 43 The section began
with the following statement of legislative intent:
It is the intent of the Legislature that agencies use rulemaking rather
than adjudication as the primary method of policy development and
implementation. It is the further intent of the Legislature that as
40. See City of Tallahassee v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 433 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1983);
Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Indiantown Tel. Sys., Inc., 435 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Bus. Reg., 393 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). If a
statute requires an agency to adopt rules to implement its terms, nonrule policy may not be
substituted. See A Professional Nurse, Inc. v. Department of HRS, 519 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1988); Upjohn Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Department of HRS, 496 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1986); Perkins v. Department of HRS, 452 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
41. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., CS for HB 2539 (1990) Staff Analysis 2
(final June 4, 1990) (on file with committee).
42. The members of the advisory group were Rip Caleen, Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez &
Cole; Richard Donelan, assistant general counsel, Department of Environmental Regulation;
Patricia Dore, associate professor, Florida State University College of Law; Richard Hixson,
staff director, House Judiciary Committee; M. Catherine Lannon, chief, Administrative Law
Section, Division of Legal Services, Department of Legal Affairs; Steven Pfeiffer, then legal
director, 1000 Friends of Florida, and currently general counsel, Department of Community
Affairs; Sharyn Smith, director, Division of Administrative Hearings; Dan Stengle, staff direc-
tor, Senate Committee on Governmental Operations; Carroll Webb, executive director, Joint
Administrative Procedures Committee.
43. Fla. HB 2539, § 1(1990) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525).
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soon as feasible, and in as much detail as practicable, policies of
general applicability be adopted under the rulemaking procedure
provided by § 120.54.44
This statement was intended to replace the present essentially neutral
legislative position which the courts have interpreted to mean that
whether policy is developed through rulemaking or through adjudica-
tion is a matter left to agency discretion. The statement clearly and
unambiguously stated a legislative preference that rulemaking be used
as the primary method for policy development. Guidelines for deter-
mining the feasibility and the practicability of rulemaking were speci-
fied.45 The guidelines attempted to confine the use of unadopted
policy to those circumstances when policy truly is incipient in the orig-
inal McDonald sense, or to those circumstances when rulemaking sim-
ply is not practicable.
The most controversial aspect of the bill was the remedy it provided
when an agency relied on unadopted policy to control a material as-
pect of an adjudication.46 Unless an agency proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it was neither feasible nor practicable to
adopt the unadopted policy through regular rulemaking procedures,
the agency was liable for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred
44. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(1)).
45.
The factors to be considered when determining whether an agency should have
adopted a policy by rulemaking include:
(a) With regard to the feasibility of policy adoption by rulemaking:
1. The extent to which the agency has had the opportunity to accumulate the neces-
sary knowledge and experience to permit resolution of the matter by rulemaking.
2. The extent to which an agency has used the workshop process expeditiously and
in good faith to develop rules for adoption.
3. The extent to which the agency has in good faith attempted to adopt rules which
support the proposed action.
(b) With regard to the practicability of policy adoption by rulemaking:
1. The extent to which further detail or precision can reasonably be achieved by the
agency.
2. The extent to which the particular questions addressed involve complex facts and
policy considerations and are of such a narrow scope that more detailed or specific
resolution is impractical outside of an adjudication to determine the substantial inter-
ests of a party based on individual circumstances.
Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(3)(a)-(b)). The concept of requiring rule adoption when fea-
sible and practicable was borrowed from section 2-104 of the 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 12, at
29. The first feasibility criterion and the second practicability criterion were taken from among a
number of criteria suggested by Professor Bonfield. See Bonfield, Mandating State Agency Law-
making by Rule, 2 B.Y.U. J. Pus. L. 161, 207-208 (1988).
46. The bill defined the phrase "unadopted policy" to mean a rule "that has not been
adopted through the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54." Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. §
120.525(2)(c)).
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by a principal party.4 7 Principal party was defined to mean "a party
whose substantial interests [were] materially affected by an unadopted
policy." The award of fees and costs was limited to ten thousand
dollars to one principal party or an aggregate amount of thirty thou-
sand dollars when more than one principal party was involved in the
proceeding. 49 The demand for fees and costs was to be made by sepa-
rate petition filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings
(DOAH) no later than 21 days after the final order in the original
120.57(1) proceeding was served.5° The hearing officer's order deter-
mining whether it was feasible or practicable to adopt unadopted pol-
icy as a rule and awarding fees and costs when appropriate was a final
order subject only to judicial review.5' This remedy was exclusive.5 2
The remedy provided by House Bill 2539 was controversial for a
number of reasons. First, the agency could fail to carry the burden of
proof necessary to convince the hearing officer that it was not feasible
or practicable for it to have adopted the unadopted policy through
regular rulemaking procedures. But because this determination was
not made until sometime after the final order was rendered, the policy
would have been applied and the principal party could have lost the
case on the merits, but his or her attorney could recover the fees and
costs incurred in "winning." The principal party could not improve
his situation one wit. He could only financially punish the agency for
unfairly beating him. Second, because the attorneys' fees and costs
remedy was exclusive, a party could not challenge the unadopted pol-
icy in a 120.56 rule validity challenge proceeding. Use of the validity
challenge proceeding for contesting an agency's use of unadopted pol-
icy has fallen on hard times, but it is still theoretically available for
use against unadopted policy that clearly is generally applicable.53
Third, awarding attorneys' fees and costs would divert public money
away from the agencies' programs, and, therefore, away from provid-
ing necessary public services. This objection was based on the princi-
ple of not using tax money to pay for private legal services. There
were no reliable estimates of the actual costs likely to result.5 4 Another
47. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(3)).
48. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(2)(b)).
49. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(5)).
50. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(4)).
51. Id.
52. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(7)).
53. See Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Central Corp., 551 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989);
Florida State University v. Dann, 400 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
54. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., CS for HB 2539 (1990) Staff Analysis 15
(final June 4, 1990) (on file with committee). The bill did require DOAH to report each award of
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concern was that the proposed remedy would result in undesirable sat-
ellite litigation. The fear was that claims for fees and costs would be
filed routinely after 120.57(1) proceedings were completed.
By the time the Conference convened, these arguments and others
had already been voiced. The staff of the House Committee on Gov-
ernmental Operations prepared what was called a Proposed Staff
Amendment." The text of the amendment was made available to Con-
ference participants.
The Proposed Staff Amendment attempted to meet at least some of
the objections that had been raised to House Bill 2539. Under the
amendment, when an agency gave notice at least ten days before the
120.57(1) hearing that it intended to rely on identified unadopted pol-
icy in the hearing, a principal party had to claim relief before the end
of the 120.57(1) proceeding. 6 If the agency did not carry its burden on
the feasible or practicable standard, and if the hearing officer con-
cluded that the unadopted policy could have been and should have
been adopted as a rule, then the hearing officer was directed to "in-
validate the unadopted policy as applied unless to do so would signifi-
cantly harm the public interest, unfairly prejudice parties to the
adjudication other than the agency, or countermand specific legisla-
tive direction of the law being implemented by the agency .... ,57 If
any of those events would result from invalidation of the unadopted
policy, then the hearing officer was to award the attorneys' fees and
costs incurred for the entire 120.57(1) proceeding, up to the limits al-
lowed, as an alternative remedy.58 When an agency did not give notice
at least ten days before the hearing of its intent to rely on unadopted
policy, then the House Bill 2539 remedy discussed above was applica-
ble. 9 In either event, the remedy specified was exclusive. 60
fees and costs to the JAPC, which was to include the information in its annual report. In addi-
tion, each agency was required annually to report to the governor, the Senate President and the
House Speaker information regarding the fees and costs it paid. Fla. HB 2539, § 1 (proposed §
120.525(6)).
55. Fla. HB 2539, Proposed Staff Amendment (undated) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Govtl. Ops.).
56. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(3)(c)).
57. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(3)(d)).
58. Id. The limits on fees and costs in the Proposed Staff Amendment were much higher
than the limits in the House bill. The inconsistency between the two was caused by subcommittee
action lowering the bill's limits after the amendment had been submitted for publication in the
Conference materials. Participants were told to disregard the higher limits in the amendment,
and to consider the merits of the amendment based on the assumption that the limits were the
same as those in the bill. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 132 (Mar. 16,
1990) (remarks of Patricia Dore) (transcript on file at Fla. Dep't. of State, Div. of Library
Servs., Tallahassee, Fla.)
59. Fla. HB 2539, Proposed Staff Amendment, supra note 55 (proposed FLA. STAT. §
120.525(3)(f)).
60. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(4)).
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Obviously, many of the objections to the bill's remedy were equally
applicable to the alternative remedies proposed by the amendment.
The remedies proposed by the amendment, like the bill's, were exclu-
sive. Therefore, a party still lost the right to challenge unadopted pol-
icy in a 120.56 proceeding. Attorneys' fees and costs would still be
awarded in some circumstances, and thus the objection to using public
money to pay for private legal services still was there. Both the award-
ing of attorneys' fees and costs and the likelihood of satellite litigation
would be reduced to the extent that agencies gave the requisite notice
of intent to rely on unadopted policy in a 120.57(1) proceeding, but
neither would have been eliminated. But the most critical objection
advanced against the bill was met in large part. By requiring a party to
raise and to litigate the question of whether it was feasible or practica-
ble for the agency to adopt as a rule the unadopted policy it intended
to rely on during the very proceeding in which the contested policy
was to be used, and by allowing the hearing officer to invalidate the
policy in that case, meant that at least the party had the possibility of
improving his situation. It was possible to win on the merits because
of agency dereliction of duty. Whether that was enough to make the
whole concept palatable was a question put to the Conference partici-
pants.
The Conference was asked to consider whether the use of una-
dopted policy was the problem the advisory group thought it had be-
come. And, if some consensus on that matter were reached, the
question then became whether any of the solutions proposed an ap-
propriate way to handle it.
B. Subject Matter Indexing of Agency Orders
Since the 1974 revision, chapter 120 has required that agencies
"make available for public inspection and copying .. . [a]ll agency
orders [and] [a] current subject-matter index, identifying for the pub-
lic any rule or order issued or adopted after January 1, 1975."61 In
1979, a provision was added to permit agencies to comply with these
requirements "by designating by rule an official reporter which pub-
lishes and indexes by subject matter each agency order rendered after
a proceeding which affects substantial interests has been held. "62
A literal reading of the statute seems to require agencies to keep all
orders available and to maintain a subject matter index of all orders
61. Ch. 74-310, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 952, 955 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(b)-
(c) (1989)).
62. Ch. 79-299, § 2, 1979 Fla. Laws 1589, 1591 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(4)
(1989)).
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issued since the date specified, but by designating an official reporter
the duty is only to keep and index orders rendered after a 120.57(1) or
(2) proceeding is held. No reason for the different obligations is ap-
parent. Further, the statute does not set forth any criteria for estab-
lishing and maintaining an acceptable and accessible subject matter
index of agency orders. Nor does the statute require agencies that des-
ignate an official reporter to supply orders to that reporter or require
the official reporter to index and publish every order that is supplied
by agencies. These and other problems with the current statutory re-
quirements relating to indexing and preserving agency orders for pub-
lic inspection were detailed in a staff report done by the Senate
Governmental Operations Committee in 1989.63
The staff report noted that there are only two official designated
reporters indexing and publishing agency orders for Florida agencies.
One, the Florida Public Employee Reporter, indexes and publishes all
Florida Public Employee Relations Commission orders dealing with
collective bargaining. 64 That reporter appears to be satisfying the de-
mands of the statute. The other is the Florida Administrative Law Re-
ports (FALR), which indexes and publishes some of the orders it
receives from about eighteen agencies. 65 The FALR was publishing
only about five percent of the total number of pages submitted to it in
1989. 6 Because of limited space and the large amount of material, the
FALR publisher imposes his own selection criteria:
Those orders which are determined by the publisher to have
precedential value, thus all orders in which the agency fills in
interstices in the statutes, rules, and case law, are published in the
FALR. Appropriately, declaratory statements are published also.
More specifically, the policy of the FALR is that orders which repeat
a point that has been well-decided in prior orders, and which do not
state or cite nonrule policy of the type indicated in the McDonald
decision, do not merit either publication or indexing. 67
Thus, agencies relying on the FALR to satisfy statutory require-
ments to make and to maintain a complete subject matter index and
63. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., A Review of Indexing of Agency Orders Issued
Pursuant to Chapter 120, F. S., The Administrative Procedure Act (Apr. 1989) (on file with
committee) [hereinafter Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops. Staff Review of Indexing].
64. Id. at 63. The Florida Public Employee Relations Commission produces in-house its
own publication reporting orders relating to appeals from disciplinary and dismissal actions
taken against permanent state employees in the career service. Id. at 62.
65. Id. at 55.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 54-55.
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to publish all orders resulting from adjudicatory proceedings under
120.57(1) or (2) are coming up far short of the mark. Indeed, the staff
report noted that "[u]ntil recently, those orders which were unpub-
lished by the FALR were destroyed."" Now, orders that are sent to
FALR but are not published "are filed and stored in a secure facil-
ity. ' " The report claimed that for a nominal charge FALR would
search and copy documents requested by a subscribing agency.70 How
this was accomplished without an index was not explained.
Things are even more bleak at agencies that perform the indexing
and storing tasks in-house. The following is just a sample of what the
staff report contains on this subject:
At least seven [agencies surveyed] fail to fully comply with the law
requiring indexing of currently-issued orders. A number of other
agencies that have recently designated a reporter, such as in the last
three years, had no subject-matter index prior to designation....
Attorneys maintain that they are unable to locate orders by subject-
matter index at many agencies, either because the index is not
maintained at all, or is poorly prepared and maintained.... Several
agencies either presently maintain, or until recently maintained, only
a chronological index or an index by party name .... Other agencies
have compiled rudimentary indexes that are lists or files of orders by
type of case.... Such an index might break hundreds of orders
down into two or three categories under which researchers must
conduct an order-by-order search. Attorneys for some agencies ...
argued ... the name of a party to a proceeding or the section
number of a statute to which a proceeding relates is an adequate
designation of subject matter. 71
Living as we do in the age of mainframes, computer databases, mo-
dems and the personal computer, perhaps this technology will be used
to save what from all accounts is a desperate situation. Indications
are, however, that the very few agencies that have gone to computer
databases to store agency orders are not inclined to share the informa-
tion. The Public Service Commission does keep its orders in a data-
base that can be searched using key words. A print out is available
quarterly by mail upon request. 72 In 1989, the Department of Insur-
ance had plans to store its orders in a database by subject matter, but
no plans to permit access to the database to anyone but its own attor-
68. Id. at 58.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 90-91.
72. Id. at 107.
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neys. Presumably, everyone else with a need or an interest will have to
continue getting by with the FALR, the department's designated re-
porter. 7 There is a glimmer of generosity coming from the Live Oak
district office of the Suwannee River Water Management District. Ac-
cording to the staff report, the public may access the district's two
databases to locate records of uncontested permits that are issued and
to locate by subject matter the district's orders. "The district also
prints out a monthly journal based on the information in the com-
puter databases. The journal is available by mail." 74
Armed with this information about the state of compliance with
subject matter indexing and the availability of agency orders for pub-
lic inspection requirements, the staff of the Senate Governmental Op-
erations Committee went to work crafting a bill to address the many
problems it had identified.75 The bill passed the Senate;76 it was not
taken up by the House and died in Senate messages upon adjourn-
ment sine die.77 The matter remained a priority and during the interim
between the 1989 and 1990 regular legislative sessions the study con-
tinued and the staff recommendations were refined. 78 A discussion of
the major features of the 1990 version of the bill follows. 79
First, an amendment to the Public Records Act was proposed to
make clear that agency orders required to be indexed or listed by an-
other section of the bill had "continuing legal significance" and must
be permanently maintained in accordance with Department of State
rules.8 0 Because the Department of State has responsibility for preserv-
ing and protecting official state records and other material denomi-
nated public records by law, it was the obvious agency to vest with
supervisory authority over all other agencies' compliance with the new
directives being proposed. Consequently, the Department of State was
to be given broad new authority to control and to monitor all agen-
cies' implementation of the new legislative requirements.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 107-08.
75. Fla. CS for SB 1334 (1989).
76. FLA. S. JOUR. 503 (Reg. Sess. 1989).
77. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1989 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 209, CS for SB 1334.
78. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., A Supplement to A Review of Indexing of
Agency Orders Issued Pursuant to Chapter 120, F.S., The Administrative Procedure Act (April
1989) (Mar. 1990) (on file with committee).
79. The result of their efforts was in proposed committee bill form at the time the Confer-
ence was held. See Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., PCB 90-6. The proposed committee bill
became Senate Bill 2550 and ultimately Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 2550 after the Con-
ference ended. All further citations are to the committee substitute bill unless citation to an
earlier version is necessary for clarity.
80. Fla. CS for SB 2550, § 1 (1990) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 119.041 (2)).
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The heart of the reform measure was to be a major rewrite of sec-
tion 120.53. The agency orders required to be indexed were specified:
a. Each final agency order resulting from a proceeding under s.
120.57(1) or (2);
b. Each final agency order rendered pursuant to s.. 120.57(3) which
contains a statement of agency policy that may be the basis of future
agency decisions or that may otherwise contain a statement of
precedential value;
c. Each declaratory statement issued by an agency; and
d. Each final agency order resulting from a proceeding under s.
120.54(4) or s. 120.56.81
Meaningful access to the first three categories of orders is, without
doubt, essential. For that matter, so is access to the fourth category,
but the language used creates an ambiguity. Agencies do not render
final orders from 120.54(4) or 120.56 proceedings. The final orders
from those proceedings are rendered by hearing officers at DOAH.
The hearing officers are not agencies, and DOAH, which is an
agency, does not render the final orders in those proceedings. Surely,
someone should be required to keep a subject matter index of these
final orders, but the ambiguous language may result in no one taking
the responsibility. In my judgment, DOAH should be responsible for
indexing hearing officers' final orders resulting from 120.54(4) and
120.56 proceedings, and that should be made clear by placing a specif-
ically worded provision covering these orders in a separate paragraph.
If the agencies whose proposed or existing rules are the subjects of a
120.54(4) or 120.56 proceeding are responsible for indexing the hear-
ing officers' final orders, that obligation must be stated more clearly.
A list containing the names of the parties and the number assigned
to the final order rendered pursuant to 120.57(3) would have to be
kept if those final orders were excluded from the indexing and public
inspection requirements because they did not contain policy state-
ments or have other precedential value. The Department of State
would have to approve the exclusions. When making a determination
about exclusion, the Department would consider an agency's argu-
ments, but the only orders that could be approved for exclusion were
those "of limited or no precedential value, . . . [those] of limited or
no legal significance, or [those] which are ministerial in nature .... ,,1
This list of excluded orders would have to be available for public in-
81. Fla. CS for SB 2550, § 2 (1990) (proposed FA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)(3)(a)-(d)).
82. Id. (proposed FIA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(d)).
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spection and copying, and a subject matter index of all listed orders
would have to be maintained.83 Indexing or listing of agency orders
would have to be done within 120 days after filing in accordance with
procedures approved by the Department of State.84
All agencies would have to acquire written approval from the De-
partment of State (1) of the specific types of orders that may be ex-
cluded from indexing and public inspection; (2) of the method to be
used to maintain indexes, lists, and orders that must be indexed or
listed and made available to the public; (3) of the method by which
indexes, lists, and orders may be inspected or copied; (4) of the num-
bering system to be used to identify orders that must be indexed or
listed; and (5) of the proposed rules the agency intends to adopt relat-
ing to these requirements for indexing and making orders available to
the public. 85 In addition, each agency would have to adopt rules that
specify (1) the specific types of orders which it excludes (with permis-
sion from the Department of State) from indexing and public inspec-
tion; (2) the location where indexes, lists, and orders may be inspected
or copied, as well as the procedure to be followed when inspection or
copying is requested; (3) all systems, including any automated system,
in use by the agency to search and find orders, and how assistance and
information regarding orders may be received; and (4) the numbering
system used to identify orders.8 6 Orders required to be indexed or
listed would have to be sequentially numbered in the order they were
rendered.87
The bill also attempted to deal with the problems encountered by
the public when agencies designate an official reporter to index and to
publish orders. Agencies still would have been permitted to designate
an official reporter to satisfy the indexing and public inspection re-
quirements. However, those requirements would be satisfied only if
the official reporter indexed and published all agency orders required
to be indexed and made available for public inspection.8 This would
not permit an official reporter to impose its own selection criteria for
83. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)(4).
84. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(b)). The language in this paragraph is a bit inart-
ful. Orders are not filed, they are rendered. Therefore, the 120 day period within which orders
must be indexed or listed should begin when the orders are rendered.
85. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c)(l)-(5)).
86. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(e)-(h)). The bill also requires agencies to make all
search capabilities used by the agency available to the public subject to reasonable terms and
conditions, including a reasonable charge. Id. (proposed FIA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(g)). But agencies
are not required to make the public aware of this obligation to share by adopting a rule disclos-
ing it.
87. Fla. CS for SB 2550, § 3 (1990) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.59(l)(c)).
88. Fla. CS for SB 2550, § 2 (1990) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.53(4)(a)).
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indexing or publishing as the FALR currently does. The listing of all
120.57(3) orders, which need not be indexed because they have no
precedential value and do not contain policy statements, could have
been done by a designated reporter, but the agency would have been
required to retain each listed order and make it available for public
inspection. 9 Those 120.57(3) final orders which the bill required to be
indexed because they do contain policy statements or do have prece-
dential value, would not have to be published in full by a designated
reporter. However, those orders would have to be kept by the agency
and be made available for public inspection, and the official reporter
would have to index them and publish a synopsis of each one. The
synopsis would have to contain the names of the parties, identify any
relevant rule, statute, or constitutional provision involved, provide a
factual summary, if one was included in the order, and summarize the
final disposition90
The bill would have allowed agencies to publish their own official
reporters, or to contract with a publisher to publish their official re-
porters, 9' or the Department of State could publish or contract for the
publishing of agency official reporters. If an agency contracted with a
publisher, the agency would have remained responsible for the "qual-
ity, timeliness, and usefulness of the reporter." 92 If the Department of
State contracted with a publishing firm, the department would be-
come responsible for quality, timeliness, and usefulness. 93
The Senate bill, if enacted, would have brought about long overdue
and necessary changes in the way most Florida agencies handle their
indexing and public inspection obligations. It may appear to some to
have been too heavy handed, but I think not. We have had fifteen
years experience with the revised chapter 120, and at all times during
those fifteen years agencies have been required to compile and main-
tain subject matter indexes of their orders and to keep those orders
available for public inspection. Left to their own devices, agencies
simply have not done the job. The staff report makes the case for
reform, but let me add a personal anecdote. Some years ago I was
89. Id.
90. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.53(4)(d)).
91. FLA. STAT. § 120.53(4) (1989) allows an agency to designate an official reporter, but it
does not require the agency to contract with the reporter it designates. The staff report noted
that neither of the two publishing fi-ms currently designated as official reporters for Florida
agencies has contracts with the agencies they serve. Without contracts, of course, the publishers
are under no enforceable obligation to continue the service they are providing. This makes the
agencies particularly vulnerable to the whims of their publishers. Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops.
Staff Review of Indexing, supra note 63, at 73-78.
92. Fla. CS and SB 2550, § 2 (1990) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.53(4)(b).
93. Id.
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playing with an idea in my mind. I needed a copy of the final order
from the McDonald case to know whether I was onto something
worth pursuing. The final order underlying McDonald, the Marbury
v. Madison of Florida administrative law, was not to be found. It is
time, indeed past time in my judgment, for the Legislature to address
the many and serious inadequacies in the current system. The Senate
bill may not have provided all the solutions, but it certainly would
have brought us a long way toward a more useful and accessible sys-
tem. And, it can be hoped, a system that will not lose or destroy any
more of its history.
IV. AGENDA Topics AND REPORT
At past administrative law Conferences each small group discussed
a different substantive topic and reported its conclusions to the assem-
bled group. This approach enabled Conference participants to select
the topic of greatest interest to them, but the downside was that only a
few people actually grappled with the details of each of ten substan-
tive topics. At this year's Conference a different approach was tried.
Participants were assigned to small groups in an effort to achieve bal-
ance between government sector people and private sector people.
Each small group, however, was given the same agenda to guide its
discussions)" The small groups' agenda items and a summary of their
discussions and conclusions presented to the Conference by the small
group leaders follow. 9
94. The agenda originally included nine items. None of the small groups had time to con-
sider the last two topics. They are reproduced here in the interest of completeness. (8) Was
Adam Smith Enterprises correctly decided? (See Adam Smith Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Regulation, 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), articulating standards of re-
view for appeals from rule challenges and from rules adopted after public hearings). If not, what
standards should courts use to review the results of the various rulemaking proceedings? (9) On
balance, how effective has "the impressive arsenal of remedies" provided by chapter 120 rule-
making procedures been in increasing citizen involvement in the process? Are the procedures
unnecessarily cumbersome? Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 137-38 (Mar.
16, 1990).
95. There were ten small groups. The small group leaders were: former Rep. Bob Hector,
Dem., Miami, 1966-1980; former Rep. Murray Dubbin, Dem., Miami, 1963-1974; Drucilla Bell,
chairwoman of the Administrative Law Section; Arthur England, former Florida Supreme Court
Justice and Chief Justice; Betty Steffens, member of the Administrative Law Section Executive
Council; Harold Levinson, professor of law at Vanderbilt University; McFerrin Smith, chief
judge, Florida Seventh Judicial Circuit; Johnny Burris, professor of law at Nova University;
Sen. Curtis Kiser, Repub., Clearwater, Chairman of the Senate Governmental Operations Com-
mittee; and former U.S. Rep. Kenneth "Buddy" MacKay, Dem., Ocala (MacKay currently is
lieutenant governor of Florida, and he served in the Legislature from 1968 until 1980). Kiser and
MacKay were unable to attend the plenary session on March 17 so Patricia Dore, associate pro-
fessor of law at Florida State University, and former Rep. William Andrews, Dem., Gainesville,
1966-1978, respectively, filled in for them. William Hyde, member of the Administrative Law
Section Executive Council, served as reporter for the Hector group.
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A. Should agencies be required to prepare economic impact
statements for all rules they propose to adopt or would some
mechanism similar to section 3-105 [Regulatory Analysis] of the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981) be more
appropriate?
Eight small group leaders reported that their groups had considered
the economic impact statement question. Among those groups there
was broad support for the view that the economic impact statement
requirement as interpreted by the courts today is largely useless.9
Even apart from the harmless error review standard applied by the
courts, two group leaders expressed the view that the whole business
of trying to project economic impact was inherently subjective and
untrustworthy.Y
Some groups seemed to think that the agency proposing the rule
was not really the proper entity to assay a rule's economic impact.
One group thought the Legislature should shoulder the responsibility
itself: "They are the ones that will establish policy. They are the ones
that will be looking at whether the policy they are establishing is going
to have an economic impact in the first instance." 98 Another group
thought perhaps some specialized agency ought to be charged with the
task of developing economic impact statements rather than the agency
proposing the rule which, it was said, "might have some con-
flict .... 9 Yet another group suggested that "the Joint Administra-
tive Procedures Committee hire some economists [who] could serve as
consultants to agencies to help them prepare their economic impact
statements. " 00
At least two groups supported the notion that the Legislature
should selectively impose the economic impact statement requirement.
One thought it especially necessary when a new tax law was to be im-
plemented by rule.'1' The other thought an economic impact statement
should be required when "a regulator is given the authority to set fees
or to regulate rates or to do [other things that] impact directly upon
the consuming public ....
96. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 34 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of
William Hyde); id. at 36 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at 37 (remarks of Arthur England);
id. at 40 (remarks of Patricia Dore); id. at 42 (remarks of William Andrews); id. at 44-45 (re-
marks of McFerrin Smith).
97. Id. at 34 (remarks of William Hyde); id. at 43 (remarks of Arthur England).
98. Id. at 35 (remarks of William Hyde).
99. Id. at 37 (remarks of Murray Dubbin).
100. Id. at 37 (remarks of Drucilla Bell).
101. Id. at 44 (remarks of Betty Steffens).
102. Id. at 43 (remarks of William Andrews).
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Two groups that thought imposing the obligation to craft an eco-
nomic impact statement on agencies did not serve a useful purpose
suggested what they considered more appropriate remedies. One
group was convinced that the people who will bear economic conse-
quences will communicate that message to the agency. Because the in-
formation will be presented by those affected in any event, this group
wondered, "[w]hy then force the agency to go through a speculative
activity [when] they don't have the staff[?]"10 3 They preferred to make
"undue economic impact" a basis for a validity challenge.I °4 The
other group seemed less sure that the information would be forthcom-
ing from affected people under the current system. They suggested
"that perhaps some form of expanded workshop with the public and
the [regulated] industry ... would do more good for the development
of the actual impact ... .
Only three groups actually endorsed a model based on section 3-105
of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1981.' °0 And of
those three only one identified the entity that would trigger the prepa-
ration of economic impact analyses. That group thought the JAPC
should determine when an economic analysis should be done on a pro-
posed rule.1 7 In response to an earlier observation that the JAPC
staff may lack the necessary expertise to perform this function,1°a the
group leader said, "it seems to be a far easier thing for the legislature
to add to itself the staff that it needs to do a particular job than it is
for the [agencies] to get the legislature to give them the ... staff they
need.'"°9
In summary, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the current
state of affairs relating to the economic impact statement require-
ment. Some people think it should be abolished outright. Others
worry that some rules should be accompanied by an economic impact
analysis. Virtually all agree that this is one area of reform that cries
for legislative attention. If streamlining the rulemaking process is a
desirable goal, the economic impact statement requirement as it now
exists is a major obstacle that should be removed. When the Legisla-
ture does look at this problem, I, for one, ask that their response be
103. Id. at 38 (remarks of Arthur England).
104. Id. at 39-40.
105. Id. at 36 (remarks of Murray Dubbin).
106. Id. at 37 (remarks of Drucilla Bell); id. at 40-41 (remarks of Patricia Dore); id. at 45
(remarks of McFerrin Smith).
107. Id. at 41 (remarks of Patricia Dore).
108. Id. at 38-39 (remarks of Arthur England).
109. Id. at 41 (remarks of Patricia Dore).
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one that all agencies can do and do well. Otherwise, we will continue
to waste time and money on a feels-good-does-nothing venture.
B. Should one person who will be substantially affected by a
proposed rule if it is adopted be able to challenge the validity of the
proposed rule before it is adopted and becomes effective? Or would it
be better to give prefiling review authority to the Attorney General?
Florida appears to be the only state that permits a substantially af-
fected person to challenge the validity of a proposed rule in an admin-
istrative adjudicatory proceeding."10 Some states do require review of
proposed rules by the attorney general;"' others require review by the
governor." 2 So it seemed appropriate to question whether Florida's
unique process was worth keeping.
With only one exception, the small group leaders reported consen-
sus that the validity challenge to proposed rules should be retained." 3
The one dissenting group apparently did not reach consensus, but the
group leader reported some sentiment to abolish the validity challenge
to proposed rules as a way to simplify the rulemaking process and
perhaps to encourage rulemaking." 4
110. See Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 F. ST. U.L. REv. 965,
1012 (1986).
111. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1041 (Supp. 1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-4-103(8)(b) (1988);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-169 (West 1988); Ind. Code. Ann. § 4-22-2-32 (Burns 1990); Iowa
Code Ann. § 17A.4(4)(a) (West 1989); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 77-420(b) (1989); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 5, § 8056(1)(A) (1989); Md. State Gov't Code Ann. § 10-107 (Supp. 1990); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 24.245(1) (West Supp. 1990); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 14.26 (West 1988); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 84-905.01 (1987); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-02(7) (Supp. 1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-
211 (1985); Va. Code § 9-6.14:9.1 (1989). In Alaska, proposed rules are reviewed by the Depart-
ment of Law. Alaska Stat. § 44.62.060 (1989). California requires the Office of Administrative
Law to review proposed rules, with provision for gubernatorial override. Cal. Gov't Code §§
11349.3-.5 (West Supp. 1990). In North Carolina, the attorney general's acceptance of rules for
filing constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with the administrative procedure act. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 150B-59(b) (1986). Wyoming requires the attorney general to give advice and assis-
tance to all agencies in preparing, revising, codifying, and editing new and existing rules. Wyo.
Stat. § 16-3-104(d) (Supp. 1990).
112. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-3(c) (1985); Ind. Code Ann. § 4-22-2-33 (Burns 1990); Iowa Code
Ann. § 17A.4(4)(a) (West 1989); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-908 (1989); Va. Code § 9-6.14:9.1 (1989);
Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-103(d) (Supp. 1990).;In Louisiana, the Governor may veto a legislative objec-
tion to a proposed rule. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:968(G) (West 1987). In Vermont, proposed
rules are reviewed by an interagency committee on administrative rules appointed by the Gover-
nor. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 820 (1985).
113. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 47 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of
Harold Levinson); id. (remarks of Betty Steffens); id. (remarks of Patricia Dore); id. (remarks
of McFerrin Smith); id. at 48 (remarks of Johnny Burris); id. at 48-49 (remarks of Drucilla Bell);
id. at 49 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at 49-50 (remarks of Arthur England).
114. Id. at 46 (remarks of William Andrews).
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Some groups found the idea of substituting review by the attorney
general to be impractical or unworkable in Florida. One group leader
reported a feeling in his group that because the attorney general usu-
ally was not affected by the proposed rules he would be reviewing, he
would lack the incentive to advance a challenge." 5 Another group
leader noted that a peculiarity of executive branch organization in
Florida made the attorney general especially inappropriate to under-
take this exercise. Because the Governor and the elected cabinet,
which includes the attorney general, sit as the agency head for several
agencies, review by the attorney general was seen as creating too many
opportunities for conflict." 6 Another observed that the attorney gen-
eral may not be interested in undertaking prefiling review of all agen-
cies' proposed rules."17 Finally, it was noted that the attorney general
has no particular expertise qualifying him to perform this assign-
ment." 
8
Two group leaders reported sentiments in their groups to make the
validity challenge less accessible. One thought some aggressive plead-
ing review should be done by DOAH to weed out the meritless chal-
lenges that were being used only to delay the rule adoption process." 9
Another suggested that a challenger should have to show irreparable
harm and the inadequacy of other remedies, including the 120.56 chal-
lenge, in order to proceed under 120.54(4). 20 But two other leaders
reported entirely different perspectives of the process. One said that
DOAH hearing officers "found convenient and expeditious ways to
dispatch those that had no merit without a threshold requirement or
without special hearings, . . . they are simply processed effectively
and expeditiously through DOAH .... ,u21 Another noted that her
small group recognized that frequently validity challenges were filed
by people "to get leverage against the agency" but that this was not
objectionable and, indeed, seemed "to be a quite satisfactory way of
getting attention."'122
On balance, it appears that most people working with this unusual
mechanism want to keep it in place. One group that was dominated by
agency people concluded that "because it does help people protect
115. Id. at 47 (remarks of McFerrin Smith).
116. Id. at 49 (remarks of Murray Dubbin).
117. Id. at 45-46 (remarks of William Andrews).
118. Id. at 49-50 (remarks of Arthur England).
119. Id. at 48 (remarks of Johnny Burris).
120. Id. at 49 (remarks of Drucilla Bell).
121. Id. at 50 (remarks of Arthur England).
122. Id. at 51 (remarks of Patricia Dore).
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themselves from government, that it was not .. politically accepta-
ble to talk about abolishment."'2
C. Does anyone ever try to drawout of a rulemaking hearing into an
adjudicatory proceeding? Is this an innovation whose time has not yet
come? Or are agencies accommodating requests for specific
procedural protections in rulemaking hearings thus making the
drawout unnecessary? Should criteria for granting a drawout be
written into the statute or into the Model Rules?
The drawout provision is another aspect of the rulemaking process
that appears to be unique to Florida.'12 It first appeared in the 1974
revision of chapter 120 as part of the adjudicatory hearing provision in
120.57. It was relocated to a more appropriate position in the rulemak-
ing section in 1976.'12 The drawout provision reads as follows:
Rulemaking proceedings shall be governed solely by the provisions of
this section [viz. 120.54] unless a person timely asserts that his
substantial interests will be affected in the proceeding and
affirmatively demonstrates to the agency that the proceeding does not
provide adequate opportunity to protect those interests. If the agency
determines that the rulemaking proceeding is not adequate to protect
his substantial interests, it shall suspend the rulemaking proceeding
and convene a separate proceeding under the provisions of s. 120.57.
Similarly situated persons may be requested to join and participate in
the separate proceeding. Upon conclusion of the separate proceeding,
the rulemaking proceeding shall be resumed.' 2
Eight group leaders reported discussing this topic in their small
groups. Only three of those groups had people in them with any actual
drawout experience. 2 7 The comments that follow fairly represent the
tenor of the group leaders' reports: "[N]obody ... could figure out
when you get a draw-out, what have you gotten."' "It was of narrow
interest. Nobody was really excited about it. Nobody ever experienced a
successful draw-out." 2 "They agreed it wasn't well understood and
123. Id. at 47.
124. See Dore, supra note 10, at 1006.
125. See Ch. 76-131, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 216, 221 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17)
(1989)).
126. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1989).
127. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 52 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of Wil-
liam Andrews); id. at 52-53 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at 57 (remarks of William Hyde).
128. Id. at 52 (remarks of William Andrews).
129. Id. at 55 (remarks of McFerrin Smith).
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defined and not used very much, but ought to be retained." ' " "My
group did not discuss this one indepth.... The consensus was to keep
the provision as is.''131 "My group enjoyed the idea that there is some-
thing out there and they don't want to give it up yet and we don't know
how it works.' ' 32 Given this widespread lack of understanding about a
provision that the Conference participants nevertheless want to retain,
perhaps the reader will indulge me here if I depart from my reporter's
role and attempt to explain the concept and how I think it should work.
When an agency wants to adopt a rule, it publishes notice of its in-
tention in the Florida Administrative Weekly. If the proposed rule is
one which does not relate exclusively to organization, practice or proce-
dure, persons who will be affected by the rule can compel the agency to
conduct a public hearing. The public hearing, if one is requested, will
function like a legislative information gathering hearing. 33 In the vast
majority of rulemaking situations, the relatively informal legislative in-
formation gathering hearing is all that is required. On occasion, how-
ever, more formal procedures may be necessary. This is when the
drawout provision comes into play.
The drawout provision provides that a person who "timely asserts
that his substantial interests will be affected in the proceeding and affir-
matively demonstrates to the agency that the [120.54(3)] proceeding
does not provide adequate opportunity to protect those interests"'-4 is
entitled to the benefit of those procedures which can be shown to be
necessary to protect those substantial interests. At this point, the agency
has several decisions to make.
First, the agency must decide whether the claimed procedural inade-
quacy is timely advanced. It is timely if made at any time before the
conclusion of the 120.54(3) public hearing.' Second, the agency must
determine whether the petitioning person is one who has a right to re-
quest greater procedural protection. He is if important or significant
concerns personal to him will be affected if the agency adopts the pro-
posed rule under consideration. 36 Third, the agency must decide
whether the petitioning person has affirmatively demonstrated that the
specific procedural protections he seeks are necessary to protect his sub-
stantial interests. He has if each asserted need is accompanied by a spe-
130. Id. (remarks of Arthur England).
131. Id. (remarks of Harold Levinson).
132. Id. at 58-59 (remarks of Betty Steffens).
133. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a) (1989).
134. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1989).
135. See Balino v. Department of HRS, 362 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370
So. 2d 458, appeal dismissed, 370 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1979).
136. Dore, supra note 110, at 1003-09.
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cific proffer of the facts to be adduced and by an explanation of why
the evidence sought to be elicited is necessary to protect his substantial
interests. 37 Fourth, and most important, the agency must decide
whether it can expand the 120.54(3) public hearing to accommodate the
specific procedural safeguards it agrees are needed to protect the peti-
tioner's substantial interests, or whether it should permit the petitioner
to draw out of the 120.54(3) rulemaking hearing and into a 120.57 ad-
judicatory hearing. This is a judgment call which chapter 120 vests in
the agency's discretion. The drawout provision does not require an ad-
judicatory hearing to be convened unless the agency "determines that
the rulemaking proceeding is not adequate to protect [the petitioner's]
substantial interests."' 38 Because the contours of the rulemaking hear-
ing are largely within the agency's discretion, and because nothing in
chapter 120 suggests that an agency may not introduce more formality
into rulemaking hearings, it behooves agencies to expand the 120.54(3)
rulemaking hearing.
There is little reported case law on the drawout. What case law there
is mainly concerns the availability of the drawout. But from Balino v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 39 we do get a notion of
the specific kinds of procedures that would-be drawout petitioners
likely would be interested in securing-examination and cross examina-
tion of witnesses and sequestration of witnesses. Each of these protec-
tions, and perhaps others, can be extended by the agency at the
rulemaking hearing. If they are extended, the rulemaking hearing will
be more formal than usual, but certainly less formal than a full blown
adjudicatory hearing conducted under 120.57(1). But, if the petitioner
is offered the procedural safeguards he has demonstrated he needs to
protect his substantial interests, what is the harm? The petitioner has
what he said he needs and the agency retains control over the develop-
ment of its policy and saves the considerable amount of time that
would be lost if the rulemaking hearing had to be suspended pending
the completion of the adjudicatory hearing.140
On some occasions, however, "agency proceedings ... [will] affect
individual rights and create general policy at the same time, so that they
137. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 26.
138. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1989).
139. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 23-24.
140. Apparently some rulemaking hearings held before the Florida Public Service Commission
are conducted this way. During a rulemaking hearing "participants [are allowed] to cross examine
each other, and to offer argument that would otherwise not be heard in the less formal proceed-
ings." Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 53-54 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of Mur-
ray Dubbin).
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partake of adjudication and rule-making at the same time."'' 41 In these
circumstances, as Professor Levinson noted at the Conference, consti-
tutional due process may require an adjudicatory hearing and the draw-
out facilitates that process. 42 Levinson draws his point from the 1908
United States Supreme Court decision of Londoner v. City and County
of Denver.143
In Londoner, the city of Denver, upon petition by owners of prop-
erty located on a street in the city, enacted an ordinance to pave the
street. The ordinance included a map, specifications, estimated total
cost, and a formula for apportioning the costs of the paving project
among the property owners. When the paving project was completed,
the city determined the final cost and apportioned that amount among
the property owners according to the earlier adopted formula. The ap-
portioning of the total cost and the assessment of individual property
owners was also accomplished by ordinance. Some of the property
owners filed complaints about their assessments with the city but they
were denied a hearing. The ensuing law suit alleged that the enactment
of both ordinances violated due process of law.
The Court ruled that the enabling ordinance merely established the
foundation for the final assessment and thus was law making in charac-
ter. Under federal constitutional principles, law making may be done
according to any procedures established by state law. The Court went
on to hold, however, that the final assessment of the paving costs
among the individual property owners was law applying in character.
Federal due process principles require law applying decisions to be
made only after the affected property owners were given a hearing at
which they could offer proof and present arguments contesting the as-
sessments.
The drawout provision in chapter 120 is intended to implement the
Londoner holding. When agency rulemaking is in effect law making, as
it usually is, the procedural protections of the informal information
gathering hearing are adequate. But when agency rulemaking is in ef-
fect law applying, as it sometimes is, federal due process considerations
and chapter 120 require the greater procedural protections associated
with administrative adjudication.
The collective memory of the Conference participants recalled only
one time when a drawout was actually held, and that involved rezoning
141. Reporter's Comments on Proposed Administrative Procedure Act for the State of Florida,
March 9, 1974, at 6, reprinted in 3 A. England & L. Levinson, FLORIDA ADmIN.STRATivE PRACTICE
MANuAL 6 (1979).
142. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 55-56 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of
Harold Levinson).
143. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
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in Monroe County.'44 By statute all rezoning in the Florida Keys area of
critical state concern must be approved by the Department of Commu-
nity Affairs (DCA)1 4S DCA makes these determinations by rule. Re-
zoning decisions by their very nature are law applying decisions because
specific interests of identified property owners are determined. Rule-
making that is in effect law applying is precisely the circumstance the
drawout was designed to accommodate and where it should be used.
A group of map amendments to the Florida Keys' comprehensive
plan were approved by the Monroe County Board of County Commis-
sioners in October, 1987. In December, 1987, DCA published notice of
intent to adopt proposed rules which approved some of the requested
amendments and disapproved others. Twenty-five property owners
whose rezoning requests were disapproved by the proposed rules sought
and were granted drawouts. DCA referred all of the drawout cases to
DOAH to conduct proceedings under 120.57(1). Ultimately, twenty-
four cases proceeded to final hearing and a typical recommended order
with findings of fact and conclusions of law issued. The hearing officer
agreed with DCA's disapproval in thirteen instances and recommended
approval in eleven others. The recommended order was adopted with-
out modification by DCA as its final order.' 46 When the rules were
adopted by filing, the eleven rezoning requests approved by the hearing
officer were included.147
It was suggested at the Conference that acceptance of a drawout by
DOAH poses a potential conflict.'i" Consider this scenario: A drawout
petition is sent to DOAH for hearing. The hearing officer concludes,
based on the record made at the hearing, that the proposed rule is an
appropriate interpretation of the statute being implemented. The
agency adopts the recommended order as its final order and the rule is
adopted. After the rule becomes effective, a 120.56 rule validity chal-
lenge is filed. DOAH would then be in the position in the 120.56 pro-
ceeding of second guessing its own prior determination made after the
drawout hearing that the rule was a valid interpretation of the agency's
statutory authority. As the argument goes, the rule validity challenger
144. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 57 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of Wil-
liam Hyde); id. at 57-58 (remarks of unidentified speaker).
145. FLA. STAT. § 380.0552(9) (1989).
146. In re Petitions for Drawout Proceedings Pursuant to Section 120.54(17), F.S., Concerning
the Department of Community Affairs' Proposed Rules 9J-14.006 and 9J-15.006, DOAH Case
Nos. 88-1067 RGM, 88-1071 RGM, 88-1074-1077 RGM, 88-1083 RGM, 88-1092 RGM, 88-1100
RGM, 88-1113 RGM, 88-1115 RGM, 88-1117 RGM, 88-1119 RGM, 88-1121 RGM, 88-1122 RGM,
88-1128 RGM (on file with clerk, Div. of Admin. Hearings).
147. FLA. ADxMn. CODE R. 9J-14.006 (1990).
148. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 60-61 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of
unidentified speaker).
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would be inclined to believe that the playing field is not level because of
the earlier DOAH ruling.
I am not persuaded that this argument would justify a refusal by
DOAH to accept drawout hearing requests granted by an agency and
referred to DOAH for resolution. First, it seems highly improbable that
a person with the requisite interest would pursue both avenues of chal-
lenge. But if the improbable did occur, principles of res judicata would
bar relitigation of the issues resolved in the drawout hearing. 49 Second,
because a drawout petition should only be granted in those rare in-
stances when an agency proposed rule is law applying rather than law
making, a hearing officer's determination as to the appropriateness of
the proposed rule will of necessity be limited to the facts peculiar to the
case at hand. Because the hearing officer's determination in the draw-
out proceeding is fact specific, there is no justification for a validity
challenger's concern about the effect of that ruling on his own factually
different case. As the Monroe County cases show, what is appropriate
on one set of facts can be inappropriate on another.
In summary, most agency rulemaking can be accomplished following
a normal 120.54(3) rulemaking hearing. Occasionally, when rulemaking
is really law applying because important personal interests of identified
people are being decided, normal rulemaking procedures are not ade-
quate. On these occasions, the drawout provision facilitates the trans-
formation of the relatively informal rulemaking process into the formal
120.57(1) adjudicatory process. But between these two extremes lies the
truly innovative aspect of the drawout provision. A party to a rulemak-
ing proceeding conducted under 120.54(3) who is able to demonstrate
the need for specifically identified procedures in order to protect his
substantial interests is entitled to the benefit of those procedures, even
though they are not usually associated with rulemaking, during the rule-
making hearing. This expanded rulemaking hearing will accommodate
the needs of the petitioner without unduly burdening the agency and
without becoming a disincentive to rulemaking.
D. Should agencies be required to republish notice of intent to adopt
a proposed rule if substantial changes are made to the text of the
proposed rule after the initial notice? Should republication of notice be
necessary only if the changes are not made as a result of comments
made at the public hearing?
This item was prompted by two concerns. The first was that agen-
cies have too much power to change the language of a proposed rule
149. See Department of HRS v. Barr, 359 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Department of
HRS v. Professional Firefighters of Florida, Inc., 366 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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after notice of intent to adopt the proposed rule has been published.
The second was that a proposed amendment to chapter 120, which
would require republication of notice whenever changes substantially
alter the text of a proposed rule, might discourage agency willingness
to respond to legitimate suggestions made during a public hearing.
Under current law, an agency may change the text of a proposed
rule after the proposed rule has been made available for public com-
ment and before the proposed rule is adopted by filing. Section
120.54(13)(b) provides that an agency
may make such changes in the rule as are supported by the record of
public hearings held on the rule, technical changes which do not
affect the substance of the rule, changes in response to written
material relating to the rule received by the agency within 21 days
after the notice and made a part of the record of the proceeding, or
changes in response to a proposed objection by the [JAPC].
Consequently, people who are happy with a proposed rule and do not
ask for or attend a public hearing on the rule, may find out only too
late that the entire tenor of the rule was changed after a public hearing
was held or after the agency received written information. A particu-
larly nefarious agency can even deliberately mislead some segments of
the public by publishing notice of intent to adopt a proposed rule it
knows it will change when the "right" people make oral or written
presentations in response to the published notice. Furthermore,
changes that are made to a proposed rule more than twenty-one days
after the notice was published are immune from challenge in a
120.54(4) proceeding because the validity challenge petition must be
submitted to DOAH within twenty-one days of the publication of no-
tice to adopt the proposed rule."S0
House Bill 2539 would have amended 120.54(13)(b) to address these
perceived problems. The bill provided that an agency "may not
change a proposed rule in a manner that substantially alters the sub-
stance of the rule. However, an agency may terminate a rulemaking
proceeding and commence a new rulemaking proceeding for the pur-
pose of adopting a changed rule."' 5 The provision also stated criteria
for determining whether a change to a proposed rule would substan-
tially alter its substance, thus requiring republication of notice.
150. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(b) (1989). The time for filing was held to be jurisdictional in
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So. 2d 1045, 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA
1979). See also Shellfish Farmers Ass'n, Inc. v. Florida Marine Fisheries Comm'n, 12 Fla. Ad-
min. L. Rep. 39 (1989).
151. Fla. HB 2539, § 2 (1990) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 120.54(13)(b) (1989).
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The small group leaders reported a variety of responses to this
agenda item. Three groups endorsed the provision in House Bill
2539. 52 They were troubled by the basic unfairness of a system that
permits changes to be made to a proposed rule without requiring no-
tice to be given to those affected by the changes. Two of these groups
seemed to be influenced by the fact that the house bill provision was
drawn from the 1981 Model Act.153
Two other groups thought such a provision would either lead to a
never ending process, 5 4 or would discourage agencies from making
needed changes to proposed rules. 5 Both seemed to believe there was
a problem, but neither was prepared to support a solution that would
further encumber the rulemaking process. One group thought that, at
least with respect to rulemaking in a highly regulated area, the original
notice was adequate to advise everyone that they had better partici-
pate to be sure their interests were protected. 5 6 The other group pro-
posed that an agency that substantially changed a proposed rule after
publication of the original notice be required to publish notice that
substantial changes were made when the rule is adopted. They viewed
their proposal as sound because rulemaking was not delayed and be-
cause people affected by the changes would be notified promptly so
152. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 65 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of
Harold Levinson); id. at 67 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at 68-69 (remarks of William An-
drews).
153. 1981 Model Act, supra note 12, § 3-107 at 42 provides as follows:
(a) An agency may not adopt a rule that is substantially different from the proposed
rule contained in the published notice of proposed rule adoption. However, an agency
may terminate a rule-making proceeding and commence a new rule-making proceeding
for the purpose of adopting a substantially different rule.
(b) In determining whether an adopted rule is substantially different from the pub-
lished proposed rule upon which it is required to be based, the following must be
considered:
(1) the extent to which all persons affected by the adopted rule should have under-
stood that the published proposed rule would affect their interests;
(2) the extent to which the subject matter of the adopted rule or the issues determined
by that rule are different from the subject matter or issues involved in the published
proposed rule; and
(3) the extent to which the effects of the adopted rule differ from the effects of the
published proposed rule had it been adopted instead.
154. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 62 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of
Robert Hector).
155. Id. at 65 (remarks of Arthur England).
156. Id. at 63 (remarks of William Hyde). Hyde was especially concerned about the effects
of a republication requirement as applied to HRS when it proposes rules in the certificate of
need area. In this circumstance, the most interested people are health care providers with lawyers
on retainer carefully watching every move HRS makes. Id. at 69. Hyde ultimately concluded that
the HRS situation might be one of those that should be addressed specifically and not by a
"generic APA remedy [that] doesn't really fit ... [this] particular agency." Id.
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they could challenge the rule in a 120.56 validity challenge proceed-
ing., 57
Two groups noted with approval that if a republication provision
similar to the one contained in the House bill were to become law,
agencies would be encouraged to conduct workshops on proposed
rules. 158 To the extent that would be a consequence, the effect cer-
tainly would be salutary. Agencies that are able to iron out the kinks
using the workshop model will not have to face unforeseen problems
with their proposed rules after notice is published the first time. It will
be rare that republication will be required.
Finally, three groups specifically addressed the question whether
people should have another twenty-one day period after republication
to file 120.54(4) validity challenges to the substantially changed pro-
posed rule. One group recommended that the time be reduced to four-
teen days.'5 9 The other two groups seemed comfortable with the full
twenty-one days. 60
While support for the republication provision in House Bill 2539
was not unanimous, it was substantial. The fears expressed by some
that additional delay in the rulemaking process will result are real. But
the basic unfairness of "having a rule change midstream 180 degrees
and not notify the public about [it] '1161 does need legislative attention.
Perhaps the concerns of both sides of this question will be met if a
republication requirement does result in increased use of the work-
shop to develop proposed rules as some believe it will.
E. Is the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC)
performing a useful function or is filing proposed rules with them
merely a "hassle"? Could the JAPC be doing more to improve the
rulemaking process?
Most agencies must file copies of all rules they propose to adopt
with the JAPC. 62 The proposed rules along with the material that
157. Id. at 65-66 (remarks of Arthur England).
158. Id. at 66 (remarks of Drucilla Bell); id. at 67 (remarks of Murray Dubbin).
159. Id. at 67 (remarks of Drucilla Bell).
160. Id. at 64 (remarks of Patricia Dore); id. at 69 (remarks of William Andrews).
161. Id. at 67 (remarks of Murray Dubbin).
162. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(11)(a) (1989). Local school districts, community college districts
and local units of government with jurisdiction in only one county are not required to file copies
of proposed rules with the JAPC. Copies of emergency rules adopted by all agencies other than
those listed above must be filed with the JAPC. Id. In addition to the text of proposed rules,
agencies must also file detailed written statements of the facts and circumstances justifying each
proposed rule, a copy of the notice of intent to adopt each rule that was published in the Florida
Administrative Weekly, a copy of the economic impact statement, and a statement indicating
whether the proposed rule imposes more stringent standards, or the same standards imposed by
federal law, or that no federal law on the subject exists. Id.
1991]
736 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:703
must accompany them are reviewed by the JAPC acting as a "legisla-
tive check on legislatively created authority."' 63 If the JAPC objects
to any proposed rule, it must certify that fact to the agency and give
the agency a detailed statement of its objections.'" An agency may
agree to modify a proposed rule in response to the objection, with-
draw the proposed rule, or refuse to do either. 6 In the event an
agency refuses to modify or to withdraw a proposed rule in light of
the JAPC's objection, the JAPC submits a detailed written statement
of its objections to the Department of State, which publishes the state-
ment in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The location of the full
text of the objection is also published as a history note to the rule
when it is published in the Florida Administrative Code.'"6 In addition
to its authority to monitor agency rulemaking, the JAPC is also re-
sponsible for "[g]enerally review[ing] agency action pursuant to the
operation of the Administrative Procedure Act ... and [for] recom-
mend[ing] needed legislation or other appropriate action."' 67
Most of the small group leaders reported general satisfaction with
the work of the JAPC. Those groups that thought of the JAPC as
providing technical assistance to agencies engaged in rulemaking were
generally pleased with its performance.'" One group noted that the
JAPC staff does a lot of work behind the scenes with the staffs of
agencies and, as a result, is able to avoid a showdown between agen-
cies and the JAPC over rulemaking authority. 6 9 Another compli-
mented the JAPC staff for doing "a very quick, efficient, useful job
[that] probably [improves the] work product' ' 70 in the early stages of
the rulemaking process. Yet another likened the JAPC to "a good cop
163. FLA. STAT. § 120.545(1) (1989). The JAPC is to determine whether:
(a) The rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority;
(b) The statutory authority for the rule has been repealed;
(c) The rule reiterates or paraphrases statutory material;
(d) The rule is in proper form;
(e) The notice given prior to its adoption was sufficient to give adequate notice of the
purpose and effect of the rule; and
(f) The economic impact statement accompanying the rule is adequate to accurately
inform the public of the economic effect of the rule.
164. Id.
165. FLA. STAT. § 120.545(2)(a) (1989).
166. FLA. STAT. § 120.545(8) (1989).
167. FLA. STAT. § ll.60(2)(e),(f) (1989).
168. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 73-74 (Mar, 17, 1990) (remarks of
McFerrin Smith); id. at 74-75 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at 75-76 (remarks of Arthur
England); id. at 76 (remarks of William Hyde); id. at 77 (remarks of Betty Steffens); id. at 78
(remarks of Robert Hector); id. at 80-81 (remarks of Harold Levinson).
169. Id. at 74 (remarks of McFerrin Smith).
170. Id. at 77 (remarks of Betty Steffens).
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on the beat.''7 Just the fact that JAPC is there probably discourages
"mischievous activity' '1 72 by agencies. Finally, one group thought the
JAPC served a particularly important function by being the one place
in state government that has an institutional memory about the origins
and purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. 17 There was a dis-
cordant note sounded by one group that expressed the view that the
JAPC was "like an academic operation. They live in their own ...
hallowed halls.... [T]hey don't have a sense of the law in opera-
tion." 74 This group thought the JAPC could improve its usefulness if
the staff became better acquainted with how the agencies actually
work and the pressures under which they function. 75
There was some sentiment for sharpening the bite of an unheeded
JAPC objection to a proposed rule. One group recommended consid-
eration of a provision in the 1981 Model Act that places the burden on
the agency of establishing that a rule objected to by the JAPC is
within the agency's delegated statutory authority. 176 If adapted to the
Florida statutory scheme, this burden shifting could occur in several
situations. The first could be on judicial review of rulemaking pro-
ceedings conducted under 120.54(3). The second could be when either
a validity challenge is filed against the proposed rule or later after the
rule becomes effective. In both instances, the agency would have to
shoulder the burden before the hearing officer in the first place and
on judicial review of the hearing officer's final order. The third could
be when the agency seeks to enforce the terms of the rule and a 120.57
proceeding is requested. Presumably, the agency would have to carry
the burden of justification before the hearing officer and on judicial
review. Finally, the burden shifting could occur when either the
agency or a substantially interested resident of the state filed an action
in circuit court to seek enforcement of the rule objected to by the
JAPC. 77
Perhaps the harshest criticism of the JAPC was expressed as an in-
dividual's observation rather than as a group report. William An-
171. Id. at 76 (remarks of William Hyde).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 75-76 (remarks of Arthur England).
174. Id. at 79 (remarks of Johnny Burris).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 75 (remarks of Murray Dubbin). The provision Dubbin eluded to says:
After the filing of an objection by the committee that is not subsequently withdrawn,
the burden is upon the agency in any proceeding for judicial review or for enforce-
ment of the rule to establish that the whole or portion of the rule objected to is within
the procedural and substantive authority delegated to the agency.
1981 Model Act, supra note 12, § 3-204(d)(5), at 62.
177. FLA. STAT. § 120.69 (1989).
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drews, reporting for Kenneth "Buddy" MacKay in his absence, noted
that MacKay "was disappointed that JAPC did not take a role in
monitoring the effectiveness of the Administrative Procedure[]
Act. 1' 7  If the JAPC saw a role for itself to act as "an oversight su-
pervisory body on the whole administrative process,'1 7 9 it could rec-
ommend needed legislative changes to the statute in response to
judicial decisions. The specific example used suggested that a process
oriented JAPC would have picked up on the implications of the Mc-
Donald opinion's introduction of incipient agency policy into the
process, and perhaps made recommendations to the Legislature to
control those implications much sooner. 11o
Most Conference participants were satisfied with the work the
JAPC is doing. Presumably, the group leaders' reports on this ques-
tion were strongly influenced by the experiences of agency people,
who, after all, have the most contact with the JAPC. From their per-
spective, the JAPC is providing a valuable service to the executive
branch by emphasizing its role as technical assistance liaison between
the executive and legislative branches. However, it is not surprising
that a former legislator would think of the JAPC's mission in terms
of the service it provides to the Legislature. MacKay's disappointment
with the JAPC's failure to oversee the development of the whole ad-
ministrative process and to be responsible for keeping the Legislature
informed about those developments, while not widely shared by other
Conference participants, has surfaced as a major criticism of the
JAPC's performance in a post-Conference House of Representatives
staff review.' 8' It is likely that the JAPC will be rethinking its mission




181. See letter from David K. Coburn, then staff director, House Majority Office, to Carroll
Webb, executive director, Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (Oct. 16, 1990) (on file
with House Speaker's office). The letter's author is now chief of staff of the House and top aide
to Speaker T.K. Wetherell, Dem., Daytona Beach.
In preparation for assuming the speakership in November, 1990, Wetherell directed House
staff to review and evaluate the services provided to the House by the joint committees of the
Legislature. The review and evaluation of the JAPC revealed significant communication prob-
lems that impaired the legislative oversight function. According to the letter from Coburn, the
Speaker-designate requested that the following recommendations be made to the JAPC:
1. The [J]APC should discuss all evaluations of existing and proposed rules with the
appropriate legislative staff as a routine part of the Committee's review.
2. The [J]APC should develop a standard format for language in proposed legislation
that legislative staff can use in drafting legislation.
3. The [JIAPC should develop a shared data base of information on rule evaluations
that could be accessed by other legislative staff. This should include the existing data
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as a result of this internal criticism and perhaps direct some effort
toward providing better service to the Legislature.
F. Is HB 2539 a reasonably good way to control perceived abuses of
incipient policy making? Is the Proposed Staff Amendment a better
attempt? Is it a better remedy to deny agencies final order authority in
those instances when they choose to rely on unadopted policy, which
feasibly and practicably could have been adopted as a rule? If these
ideas are wrongheaded, what, if anything else, should be considered?
This item received the greatest amount of discussion time in the
small groups and in the plenary session. There was a split opinion on
the premise of the item, that is, that agencies are relying too much on
adjudication to develop policy and something should be done to re-
store the balance between rulemaking and adjudication. There was,
however, almost universal agreement that the solutions proposed by
House Bill 2539 and by the Proposed Staff Amendment were very bad
ideas. No group leader even mentioned the third suggested remedy of
denying agencies authority to issue final orders in those cases when
they chose to rely on nonrule policy that feasibly and practicably
could have been adopted as a rule. This third remedy, therefore, died
for lack of a second. In short, most participants seemed to agree that
there is a problem, but they rejected all proposed solutions in favor of
suggesting some interesting ideas of their own to deal with the prob-
lem.
Two groups were strongly of the view that agency policy making
through adjudication was entirely in keeping with acceptable adminis-
trative behavior. 18 2 One of these two groups may well have been influ-
enced by the historical perspective of the group leader, McFerrin
Smith, who was the executive director of the Florida Law Revision
base containing the Attorney[] General's opinions. The long range goal should be to
develop a single legislative oversight data base that contains comments and evaluations
by all legislative entities involved in oversight.
4. The [J]APC, as a routine part of the Committee's review should make recommen-
dations to the appropriate legislative committee when they identify statutory changes
that are necessary.
Id. at 2. The Speaker-designate also expressed concern that policymaking by adjudication was
being used to avoid the rulemaking process and the Legislature's function. He characterized this
phenomenon as "phantom government." Id. It is interesting to note that the "phantom govern-
ment" phrase was coined by former Senator Dempsey Barron, Dem., Panama City, back in
1974 and was used by him as shorthand for all the evils revised chapter 120 would address when
enacted into law. Barron served in the House from 1956-1960 and in the Senate from 1960 until
1988.
182. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 86 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of
McFerrin Smith); id. at 88 (remarks of Johnny Burris).
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Council when the Administrative Procedure Act was revised in 1973-
1974.183 According to Smith, the Law Revision Council both acknowl-
edged and approved agency lawmaking through processes other than
rulemaking. He cited the requirement to index all agency orders in the
revised statute as an acknowledgment of the principle that agencies
would make law through adjudication. 184 This group, therefore, con-
cluded that:
[when) policies merely evolve because of repeated decision making,
whether those policies become capable of converting to a rule or not,
... it [is not] an appropriate way of regulating administrative
agencies to force them into the rulemaking mode when the rest of
our entire legal system accepts the common law method of evolving
law. 185
The other group "thought incipient policy making is a fine way for
the agency to exercise its discretion. There was real doubt that incipi-
ent policy making created a problem." 8 6 It should be noted, however,
that this group seemed more inclined than the other to indulge the
perception of others that abuse does exist, and to suggest a solution to
that problem.8 7
One other group thought nonrule policy should be prohibited in
some areas but not in others. This group was particularly concerned
about the use of nonrule policy in disciplinary proceedings. Accord-
ingly, the group recommended that any standards of conduct licensed
professionals were expected to meet should be adopted as rules.
"[D] isciplinary proceeding [s] should never be [based on] incipient pol-
icy.'' 88
One group clearly reported reaching consensus "that there is a
problem with the excessive use of . . . unadopted rules[.]1 8 9 There
was apparently a difference of opinion between group members and
the group leader in another case. 19 The remaining group leaders did
183. Id. at 85 (remarks of McFerrin Smith).
184. Id. at 86 (remarks of McFerrin Smith). When chapter 120 was revised in 1974 and at all
times since agencies have been required to make available "[a) current subject-matter index,
identifying for the public any rule or order issued or adopted after January 1, 1975." Ch. 74-
310, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 952, 955 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c) (1989)).
185. Id. at 87 (remarks of McFerrin Smith).
186. Id. at 88 (remarks of Johnny Burris).
187. See notes 202 through 207 and accompanying text, infra.
188. Id. at 83 (remarks of William Andrews).
189. Id. at 92 (remarks of William Hyde).
190. Id. at 84 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at 101-02 (remarks of Murray Dubbin).
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not challenge the premise that abuse does exist, but rather went di-
rectly to the question of appropriate remedy.19'
As noted earlier, there was very little support for the sanctions pro-
posed by either House Bill 2539 or by the Proposed Staff Amend-
ment. 92 The comments rejecting the idea of imposing attorneys' fees
and costs as the penalty for using incipient policy that should have
been adopted as a rule ranged from "a resounding no' 1 93 to "not the
right way to go [because] [t]hat would not necessarily give an incentive
to an agency and [would be] unduly burdensome primarily on the tax-
paying public,"'' 9 to "it [is] unconscionable in this day of scarce
money and tight agency budgets to be handing out $10,000 to private
lawyers."'' 9 Only one group suggested that the economic sanctions
were "an important option that needed to be left open to the hearing
officer[s]. " '9
In contrast, there was substantial support for adding a statement of
legislative preference for rulemaking to the statute.1'7 Those who ad-
dressed the point appeared to support a legislative preference for rule-
making when it was determined that rulemaking was feasible and
practicable as those terms were defined in House Bill 2539.198 In addi-
tion, several other remedies were suggested by the small groups. Some
suggested that perhaps the JAPC could play a role in identifying and
reining in those agencies that excessively rely on adjudication to de-
velop policy.'9 Another suggestion was that any action taken pursu-
ant to an unadopted rule should be void.2 0 Yet another suggestion
was that an agency be given a certain period of time after the conclu-
sion of a 120.57 proceeding in which incipient policy was involved to
191. Id. at 93-94 (remarks of Harold Levinson); id. at 97 (remarks of Drucilla Bell); id. at
97-99 (remarks of Patricia Dore); id. at 99-100 (remarks of Betty Steffens).
192. Id. at 83 (remarks of William Andrews); id. at 85 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at
85 (remarks of McFerrin Smith); id. at 92 (remarks of William Hyde); id. at 94 (remarks of
Harold Levinson); id. at 98 (remarks of Patricia Dore); id. at 99 (remarks of Betty Steffens).
193. Id. at 85 (remarks of McFerrin Smith).
194. Id. at 85 (remarks of Murray Dubbin).
195. Id. at 98 (remarks of Patricia Dore).
196. Id. at 97 (remarks of Drucilla Bell).
197. Id. at 85 (remarks of McFerrin Smith); id. at 93 (remarks of William Hyde); id. at 93-94
(remarks of Harold Levinson); id. at 99 (remarks of Patricia Dore); id. at 102 (remarks of Ste-
phen Maher); id. at 116 (remarks of William Reeves, senior attorney, Department of Banking
and Finance).
198. Id. at 89 (remarks of Johnny Burris); id. at 95 (remarks of Harold Levinson); id. at
100-01 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at 117-18 (remarks of Stephen Maher); id. at 118-20
(remarks of Patricia Dore); id. at 122-23 (remarks of William Hyde).
199. Id. at 85 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at 90 (remarks of Johnny Burris); id. at 98
(remarks of Patricia Dore).
200. Id. at 84 (remarks of Murray Dubbin).
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initiate rulemaking procedures to convert the incipient policy into a
rule.20,
Perhaps the most comprehensive and well thought out solution to
the problem was suggested by a group that recommended an approach
based on strengthening the 120.54(5) initiative process. 2 2 This group
supported amending the statute to include a legislative preference for
rulemaking when rtlemaking was feasible and practicable. 20 3 They
would also amend 120.54(5) to permit a party who is on the receiving
end of incipient policy, or the JAPC, to petition for rulemaking. 204
The agency would be required to adopt the incipient policy, or some
modified version of the incipient policy, as a rule unless it could sus-
tain the burden of demonstrating that rule adoption was not feasible
or practicable. 20 5 The group believed that the advantage of their pro-
posal was that it gave the people actually affected by the use of incipi-
ent policy the power to compel rulemaking. 206 The group also
supported a streamlined rulemaking process, providing only notice
and comment opportunity, if the agency intended to adopt the incipi-
ent policy it was already using. 2 7 The group did not address the ques-
tion of what incentive there was for any private person to use this
remedy. If a party's substantial interests have already been determined
after a 120.57 proceeding in which the agency relied on incipient pol-
icy, why would a party spend more time and money to make sure that
that same policy is enshrined in a rule, particularly if rulemaking will
not include an opportunity to challenge the validity of the proposed
rule in a 120.54(4) proceeding? Because the JAPC would have an in-
stitutional interest in seeing that unadopted policy is adopted in accor-
dance with the Legislature's expressed preference, it could be expected
to pursue this remedy, but private persons simply would have no in-
centive to use it.
The staff of the House Governmental Operations Committee went
to school at the Conference. The criticisms of House Bill 2539 were
201. Id. at 99-100 (remarks of Betty Steffens).
202. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(5) (1989) provides in pertinent part:
Any person regulated by an agency or having a substantial interest in an agency rule
may petition an agency to adopt, amend, or repeal a rule. . . . The petition shall spec-
ify the proposed rule and action requested. Not later than 30 calendar days after the
date of filing a petition, the agency shall initiate rulemaking proceedings under this
act, . . . or deny the petition with a written statement of its reasons for the denial.
203. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 89 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of
Johnny Burris).
204. Id. at 90.
205. Id. at 89-90.
206. Id. at 90.
207. Id. at 91.
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heard and taken to heart. The bill was still in committee at the time
and several important changes were made to it after the Conference to
bring its provisions closer to the views expressed by Conference parti-
cipants. Specifically, Committee Substitute for House Bill 2539 stated
that "[a]gencies shall adopt those policies defined by s. 120.52(16) as
rules through the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54 when
feasible and to the extent practicable.'"' The criteria for determining
feasibility and practicability remained unchanged.2 Any claim for re-
lief had to made during the adjudicatory proceeding in which incipient
policy was sought to be applied. 210 When the hearing officer agreed
that "[i]t was feasible and practicable for the agency to have adopted
the policy by rulemaking at the time the agency relied on the policy in
support of its action or proposed action.. ,",21 the hearing officer
would have to invalidate the policy and not permit it to be used in the
case, unless that action "would significantly harm the public or un-
fairly prejudice parties to the adjudication other than the
agency.... ,, 212 In addition, the hearing officer would have to order
the agency to begin rulemaking proceedings within ninety days after
the final order in the case was rendered. 2 3 The hearing officer's find-
ings relevant to this claim were made "final and binding on the
agency.' '214 In the event the hearing officer concluded that it was not
feasible or practicable for the agency to adopt the nonrule policy as a
rule, provision was made for consideration of the nonrule policy by
the hearing officer in the 120.57 proceeding:
The nonrule policy that is ultimately applied as that of an agency
... shall be that which best complies with and promotes the intent
of the Legislature. The determination of the nonrule policy to be
applied by an agency shall be based exclusively on evidence of record
and matters officially recognized. Recommended and final orders
... shall provide an explanation of nonrule policy that includes the
evidentiary basis that supports the nonrule policy applied and a
208. Fla. CS for HB 2539, § 1 (1990) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(1)).
209. See supra note 45.
210. Fla. CS for HB 2539, § 1 (1990) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(3)(c)).
211. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(3)(a)(2)).
212. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(3)(d)(1)).
213. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.525(3)(d)(2)). A petition to enforce an order to begin
rulemaking may be filed in circuit court by any substantially affected person. If the court enters
an order enforcing the hearing officer's order, the petitioner may be awarded the attorneys' fees
and costs expended in connection with the enforcement proceeding. Any award of fees and costs
must be paid from the budget of the highest ranking administrator of the agency, and the agency
is not entitled to reimbursement under any other provision of law. Id.
214. Id. (proposed FA. STAT. § 120.525(3)(e)).
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general discussion of the justification for the nonrule policy
applied. 21 5
Finally, the committee substitute amended 120.56 to permit a per-
son substantially affected by a nonrule policy to challenge it as a vio-
lation of the legislative directive that all policies be adopted as rules
when feasible and to the extent practicable. 2 6 The hearing officer
could find all or part of a nonrule policy to be invalid and order the
agency to begin rulemaking proceedings. 21 7 The rulemaking proceed-
ings would have to be initiated within ninety days after the final order
from the validity challenge proceeding was rendered. 218
Committee Substitute for House Bill 2539 was reported favorably
by the House Governmental Operations Committee and was passed by
the House. 2 9 The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Operations where it died upon adjournment sine die of the
1990 regular session. 220
G. Should we be less concerned with making agencies adopt rules
and be more concerned with perfecting the subject matter indexing
and availability of adjudicative orders so that access to agency
unadopted policy precedents is a reality?
This item tied the issue of agency use of adjudicatory procedures to
develop policy with the issue of agency failure to develop and main-
tain useful and accessible subject matter indexes of agency orders. In-
deed, several groups responded to this question by saying that, in
effect, if there were a better indexing system in place that would go a
long way toward solving a major complaint about nonrule policy-
people cannot find it.221 But even apart from the obvious connection
to the nonrule policy problem, the general lack of complete and acces-
215. Fla. CS for HB 2539, § 4 (1990) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)(15)(b)).
216. Fla. CS for HB 2539, § 3 (1990) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.56(l)(b)).
217. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.56(3)(c)).
218. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.56(6)). A petition to enforce an order to begin rulemak-
ing may be filed in circuit court by any substantially affected person. If the court enters an order
enforcing the hearing officer's order, the petitioner may be awarded the attorneys' fees and costs
expended in connection with the enforcement proceeding. Any award of fees and costs must be
paid from the budget of the highest ranking administrator of the agency, and the agency is not
entitled to reimbursement under any other provision of law. Id.
219. FLA. H.R. JouR. 786 (Reg. Sess. 1990).
220. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1990 REGuLAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HousE BILLS
at 419, CS for HB 2539.
221. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 83 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of
William Andrews); id. at 84 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at 88-89 (remarks of Johnny Bur-
ris); id. at 108-09 (remarks of McFerrin Smith); id. at 110-11 (remarks of Drucilla Bell).
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sible subject matter indexes stands on its own as a problem of monu-
mental proportions. Addressing the indexing problem was
characterized as a "fundamental reform that had to be carried into
effect."m Without exception, each of the small group leaders who re-
ported on this item either resoundingly endorsed the need for im-
provement,223 or offered ideas about how an improved system would
benefit the process. 24
In addition to facilitating the location of incipient and other non-
rule policy, one group noted that a subject matter index helps people
within an agency, as well as those outside, to discover inconsistencies
in the application of policies. "? 5 The same group observed that a good
indexing system could protect against abrupt changes in policy caused
by changing political appointments of agency heads.2
Two groups paid particular attention to the details of making both
an indexing system and the orders themselves more accessible. One
encouraged the use of computer databases and a system that would
permit the database to be searched in a way similar to WESTLAW or
LEXIS. 227 The other stressed the importance of developing systems
that fit the needs of the individual agencies. What works well for one
agency may not work at all for another. This group also thought it
important that subject matter indexes be as inclusive as possible so
that orders other than those resulting from a 120.57 adjudicatory
hearing are included.? They suggested "including declaratory state-
ments, consent orders and perhaps even policy memoranda that the
agency wants to employ." 229 On that last point, another group indi-
cated that indexing could become a real nuisance if too many things
had to be indexed. They saw a need for a more precise definition of
what needs to be indexed. 230
Finally, one group made several suggestions about ways in which
compliance with any subject matter index requirement could be po-
liced. One idea was to require that an order be indexed before it could
be used as precedent.2' Another was to require the auditor general to
222. Id. at 88-89 (remarks of Johnny Burris).
223. Id. at 108 (remarks of Harold Levinson); id. at 108 (remarks of Murray Dubbin); id. at
113 (remarks of Johnny Burris).
224. Id. at 83 (remarks of William Andrews); id. at 109 (remarks of McFerrin Smith); id. at
110-11 (remarks of Drucilla Bell); id. at 111 (remarks of William Hyde).
225. Id. at 109 (remarks of McFerrin Smith).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 113 (remarks of Johnny Burris).
228. Id. at 111 (remarks of William Hyde).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 109-10 (remarks of McFerrin Smith).
231. Id. at 111 (remarks of William Hyde).
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inquire into an agency's compliance with an indexing requirement
when a performance audit of the agency was conducted.232 A third
idea was to require agencies to report directly to their legislative over-
sight committees the extent of their compliance or noncompliance
with an indexing requirement. Apparently this last idea came from an
agency person in the group who offered this explanation: "agencies
are particularly moved by what their own particular legislative over-
sight committee thinks. ' '233
It appears that both the small group discussions and the reports to
the plenary session were adversely affected by two planning mistakes.
The first mistake was putting the subject matter index item so far
down on the agenda that it was not reached until people were tired
and time was short. The second mistake was not including the text of
the Senate proposed committee bill in the written materials distributed
to all participants. A copy was available for each small group, but
that was not adequate. I take responsibility for both mistakes. While
the Conference did not go on record supporting the Senate bill, many
of the suggestions and recommendations that were offered by the par-
ticipants were included in the proposed committee bill.? And the
Conference certainly underscored the need for legislative attention to
be given to the subject matter index question.
Senate Proposed Committee Bill 90-6 was introduced after the Con-
ference concluded. It ultimately became Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill 2550. The bill was reported out of the Senate Govern-
mental Operations Committee, but it was pulled into the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations where it died upon adjournment sine die of
the 1990 regular session.2 35
V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Administrative Law Conference addressed Florida's
major current rulemaking process concerns. The participants generally
were not inclined to change or to modify those aspects of the process
that legitimately could be viewed as contributing to the complexity of
the process. Consequently, there was general agreement that the
120.54(17) drawout provisions should not be disturbed. If the rule-
making process ought to be simplified at all, it was generally agreed
that the economic impact statement requirement for all rules by all
232. Id. at 112 (remarks of William Hyde).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 114-15 (remarks of Patricia Dore).
235. FLA. LEoIs., HISTORY OF LGISI.ATION, 1990 REcuLAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE Bn.ts
at 204, CS for SB 2550.
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agencies was ripe for legislative reconsideration. Even at the risk of
further complicating the rulemaking process, there was substantial
support for the notion of requiring republication of notice when an
agency makes substantial changes to the text of a proposed rule after
the initial notice is published. Most participants were satisfied with the
operation of the JAPC.
The two most pressing problems-controlling abuses of policy mak-
ing through adjudication and access to and availability of final or-
ders-drew mixed reactions. Participants generally agreed that both
were serious concerns in need of legislative attention, but they did not
agree that the pending legislative proposals were the best ways of deal-
ing with the problems. Perhaps it was in these two areas that Confer-
ence participants had the most influence. Neither bill was enacted into
law during the 1990 legislative session. But the problems have not
gone away, and it is predictable that some variation of both bills will
resurface during the 1991 session. It can be hoped that both problems
will seem less intractable because of the Conference participants' ef-
forts to improve the legislative responses to them.
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